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Abstract 
According to the conventional wisdom, rape is generally a case of ‘one person’s word against 
another’s’ and, in the absence of independent evidence, judgements regarding the truth or 
otherwise of an allegation are influenced by ‘rape myths’ and gender stereotypes. The meaning 
of ‘one person’s word against another’s’, however, and the extent to which it accurately 
describes the evidence in most rape cases, or usefully explains case disposal, are largely 
unexplored. This article subjects the conventional wisdom of rape as ‘one person’s word 
against another’s’, and the implicit claims and assumptions underpinning it, to close critical 
scrutiny. Drawing on original empirical data, I argue that the concept of ‘one person’s word 
against another’s’ is vague, ambiguous, and uninformative. It tells us virtually nothing about 
what rape cases look like evidentially, still less about case progression, and presents a partial 
and misleading view of English criminal proceedings and the process of proof. If we are to 
better understand attrition in rape cases, we need to meaningfully engage with the contentious 
issue of witness credibility and reliability—not only in the absence of independent evidence 
that supports or corroborates a witness’s account, but in the presence of evidence that 
undermines or contradicts it. 
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Introduction 
When it comes to rape in the criminal justice system, ‘one person’s word against another’s’ is 
a commonplace phrase. Used by criminal justice professionals, scholars, and the man (or 
woman) in the street alike, ‘one person’s word against another’s’ is part of the common 
vernacular in discussing rape and is found, quite literally, everywhere: from conversations in 
the pub, tweets, blogs, and comments posted online; to newspaper articles (see e.g. Bowcott, 
2013; Philipson, 2014; Burrowes, 2014; Dodd and Bengtsson, 2016; Street-Porter, 2017), 
research reports (see e.g. Burrowes, 2013), academic and practitioner texts (see e.g. Jordan, 
2004a; Temkin and Krahé, 2008; Radcliffe et al, 2016), criminal justice policy (see e.g Home 
Office, 2002a; CPS, 2011) and associated press releases (e.g. CPS, 2010), Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS) legal guidance (CPS, undated), and law reports.1 In contrast to, or, perhaps, by 
virtue of its pervasive use, the meaning of the term is seldom explored or defined. Instead, the 
discourse is awash with bald, matter-of-fact statements that rape is ‘one person’s word against 
another’s. It seems, therefore, to be taken-for-granted that the term’s meaning is widely 
understood or at least readily inferred from the context in which it is used. 
Whatever it means, categorizing rape as ‘one person’s word against another’s’ is clearly 
intended to be descriptive. But it also explains. The ‘attrition problem’ in rape cases (Hohl and 
Stanko, 2015)—the so-called ‘justice gap’ (Home Office, 2002b; Kelly et al, 2005)—and ‘one 
person’s word against another’s’ have long been causally linked (see e.g. Jordan, 2004a; 
Temkin and Krahé, 2008). The relationship between the two is concisely summarized by 
Cunliffe et al (2012, pp.3-4), who, exceptionally, also provide a rare insight as to what the 
authors mean by the term: 
 
                                           
1 R v O (Wayne) [2009] EWCA Crim 2520; R v F [2010] EWCA Crim 3096; R v Dizaei (Jamshid Ali) 
[2013] EWCA Crim 88; R v Jain Hua Xie [2014] EWCA Crim 715; R v Hunter (Nigel) [2015] EWCA 
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In part the low conviction rate may be attributed to the particular characteristics of a 
rape case. In general, rape cases lack physical or any objective evidence and boil down 
to one persons’ [sic] word against another’s. A lack of objective evidence means that 
these cases often require jurors to assess whose story they believe—the complainant’s 
or the defendant’s… With little in the way of hard evidence to guide jury decision 
making rape cases are exactly the kind of cases that are open to influences of stereotypes 
and attitudes. 
 
In the absence of independent evidence in rape cases, judgements about the credibility and 
reliability of the complainant’s and accused’s conflicting accounts are said to be susceptible to 
‘rape myths’, a term first used by Burt (1980, p.217) to describe ‘prejudicial, stereotyped or 
false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and rapists’. Although the definition of the ‘rape myth’ 
has altered drastically since the 1980s (see e.g. Gerger et al, 2007), and may be contested 
(Reece, 2013; Gurnham, 2016a; 2016b; Young, 2017), the prevalence of such myths and their 
impact on attrition have reportedly not diminished. According to the conventional wisdom, the 
trouble with rape is that, evidentially, such cases generally amount to ‘one person’s word 
against another’s’ and, prejudiced by ‘rape myths’, police, prosecutors, judges, juries, and 
society at large routinely fail to take rape victims at their word (Estrich, 1987; Harris and Grace, 
1999; Jordan, 2004a; 2004b; 2011; Kelly et al, 2005; Kelly, 2010; Hohl and Stanko, 2015).  
 In addition to describing and explaining, ‘one person’s word against another’s’ is 
inherently normative. It speaks to an evidential case that is limited in both quantity and form. 
In so doing, the criminal case involving independent evidence and third-party witnesses is 
tacitly held up as the probative ideal against which cases comprised of ‘one person’s word 
against another’s’ are measured and found to be wanting. Such cases are, ostensibly, 
evidentially inferior—deficient, less than, weaker—and, as such, comparatively less likely to 
result in conviction. And, if it enables us to anticipate which cases are more or less likely to 
progress through the criminal process, ‘one person’s word against another’s’ also has predictive 
value.  
 On the face of it, then, ‘one person’s word against another’s’ is a remarkably efficient 
and effective little turn of phrase. It tells us what rape cases look like. It helps us to understand 
when, and why, rape cases fail to result in prosecution and conviction. And it usefully informs 
criminal justice reform in a targeted effort to reduce rates of attrition (see, for example, 
demands for ‘enhanced evidence gathering’, Kelly et al, 2005; CPS, 2012; ACPO, 2015). It 
does all of these things, however, only if the various claims and assumptions underpinning ‘one 
person’s word against another’s’ withstand critical scrutiny. The argument presented here is 
that they do not.  
 Drawing on unique qualitative research data, relevant legal doctrine, and criminal 
justice policy and practice, this article undertakes a searching, empirically informed and 
context-sensitive critical examination of the notion of ‘one person’s word against another’s’. 
The structure of the analysis is organized around the important but typically overlooked 
definitional question: What does ‘one person’s word against another’s’ actually mean? In 
exploring this question, both conceptually and empirically, challenges to the conventional 
wisdom of rape as ‘one person’s word against another’s’ are exposed, the implications of which 
are discussed in the article’s closing section. This article thus not only contributes to the 
existing ‘anti-rape’ (Cook, 2011) research literature and the public- and policy discourse this 
extensive body of work informs, but also to legal scholarship on ‘taking facts seriously’ 
(Twining, 1984; 2005) and inferential reasoning (see e.g. Dawid et al, 2011) in the field of 
evidence, proof, and fact-finding (e.g. Roberts and Redmayne, 2009). It begins, however, with 
a brief account of how the data presented here were generated. 
 
Methodology 
The analysis below draws on original qualitative data from two separate empirical research 
studies conducted by the author. The first, undertaken in 2007-09, and referred to throughout 
as ‘the male rape study’, examined Rape Specialist Crown Prosecutors’ decision-making in a 
sample (n=17) of male-on-male rape cases in three (of the then 42) CPS Areas. The second 
study, undertaken in 2012 and referred to throughout as ‘the female rape study’, examined 
police decision-making in a sample (n=20) of female rape cases dealt with by a specialist rape 
investigation unit covering one of the two divisions in a large, predominantly urban police 
constabulary.  
 Although distinct in terms of their individual foci, the male and female rape studies’ 
aims were essentially the same. Both studies sought to identify, describe, and critically evaluate 
the factors influencing criminal justice professionals’ decision-making in rape cases, albeit at 
different stages in the criminal process and in relation to victims of different sexes. Reflecting 
their similar research questions, the two studies utilized similar methodologies. Namely, the 
systematic and detailed analysis of a purposive sample of case-files combined with in-depth, 
semi-structured research interviews with the relevant decision-maker in individual sample 
cases: Crown Prosecutors (n=14) and Area Rape Coordinators (n=6) in the male rape study; 
and Investigating Officers (n=10) and their superiors (n=5) in the female rape study.  
 Samples like these, which are neither random nor representative and have no statistical 
power, are prone to being dismissed out of hand by those unfamiliar with or unconvinced of 
the validity and exigencies of qualitative methods. Such dismissal is unwarranted here. The 
analysis that follows is not quantitative. It does not seek to measure the occurrence of rape as 
‘one person’s word against another’s’. Rather, it asks how the concept is defined. What does 
‘one person’s word against another’s’ mean—not just in the abstract, but in practice? What do 
rape cases categorized as such actually look like, evidentially? In exploring these (purely 
qualitative) questions, the data from the male and female rape studies are invaluable.  
 Those data include transcripts from semi-structured research interviews during which 
respondents—specialist police investigators and Crown Prosecutors who deal with rape cases 
on a daily basis—talked explicitly and in detail about precisely the phenomenon under analysis 
here. Based on their professional experience, these respondents are key informants, uniquely 
placed to help us understand the meaning of ‘one person’s word against another’s’ and its 
implications for prosecution decision-making. In addition to the interview data, there are the 
case-files, the close examination of which enable us to cross-check, probe, and, where 
necessary, challenge respondents’ abstract conceptualisations in the light of concrete examples. 
Numerically, the case-file samples from the male and female rape studies are undoubtedly 
small compared to the large or at least larger n- (and primarily quantitative) studies commonly 
encountered in the mainstream rape research literature (e.g. Harris and Grace, 1999; Kelly et 
al, 2005; Feist et al, 2007; Hohl and Stanko, 2015). They are, nevertheless, diverse and 
comprehensive. The samples include allegations of rape occurring in a variety of 
circumstances, locations, and relationships, and include victims of different sexes, sexualities, 
ethnicities, mental and physical abilities, and ages. Combined, they cover the gamut of criminal 
justice outcomes from police decisions to ‘no crime’ an alleged incident right through to jury 
verdicts following a contested trial. And they contain cases that were, and others that were not, 
described as ‘one person’s word against another’s’, enabling us to identify and scrutinize the 
definitional boundaries of the concept: What does, and what does not, fall within its scope? 
Notwithstanding their limitations, the original data presented here shed fresh and much needed 
critical light on the conventional wisdom of rape as ‘one person’s word against another’s’ and 
contemporary understandings of criminal justice responses to rape. 
Finally, for the reader’s ease, it is worth taking a moment to set out the process of 
anonymization utilized in the analysis below. Reflecting the sensitive nature of the two studies 
and statutory guarantees of lifelong anonymity for rape complainants,2 anonymization here 
goes beyond that required by ethical good practice and data protection in social research. Cases 
are numbered 1 through 17 in the male rape study (MRS), and 1 through 20 in the female rape 
study (FRS). A reference to MRS Case 1 thus denotes Case 1 from the male rape study. A 
reference to FRS Case 1 denotes Case 1 from the female rape study. Police respondents from 
the male rape study are designated MRS Police A through MRS Police F. Similarly, police 
respondents from the female rape study are designated FRS Police A through M. Crown 
Prosecutors, all of whom were interviewed in the course of the male rape study, are designated 
MRS Prosecutor A through Q. No information regarding individual respondents’ gender, 
ethnicity, and so forth or rank/position in their respective organizational hierarchies is 
provided. Where personal pronouns are necessary, all police are designated male in the 
narrative, while all prosecutors are designated female. Complainants are referred to throughout 
the article as ‘C’. Suspects/accused/defendants are referred to as ‘D’, and, where necessary, 
witnesses referred to as ‘W’. Where there are multiple complainants, defendants, or witnesses, 
numerals are added: for example, C1, C2, C3, or D1, D2, and so on. 
 
Defining Terms 
Given the dearth of discussion surrounding the definition of ‘one person’s word against 
another’s, and, moreover, that it has no figurative sense or meaning, it seems reasonable to 
infer that the term may be taken literally; that it simply means what it says. Taken literally, and 
contextualized against the backdrop of the criminal process, ‘one person’s word against 
another’s’ is about evidence and proof in the reconstruction of disputed past events. More 
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specifically, it signals an absence of independent evidence that might settle the factual 
dispute—here, whether there was, in fact, a rape—one way or the other. ‘One person’s word 
against an other’s’ tells us that, faced with an allegation of rape, the relevant fact-finder is 
confronted with the conflicting testimonial accounts of two parties, neither of which is 
independently corroborated, and both of whom profess to be telling the truth.  
 Conceptually, this deductive interpretation of ‘one person’s word against another’s’ 
resonates with broader understandings of the term implicit in the critical rape discourse and 
broader public debate. It also tallies with what some police and prosecutors meant, or appeared 
to mean, when they told me during research interviews, as they frequently did, that rape is 
generally ‘one person’s word against another’s’. However, the interview data reveal a second, 
alternative interpretation of ‘one person’s word against another’s’, one which was more 
frequently invoked by respondents and broader in its scope. Both interpretative approaches are 
examined in detail below. They are referred to separately in the analysis as, (1) the literal 
approach, and, (2) the issue-based approach.   
 
The Literal Approach 
During research interviews, a number of respondents—a sizeable minority but certainly not 
all—appeared to subscribe to the literal interpretation of ‘one person’s word against another’s’ 
with cases discussed in stark, black-and-white terms of no evidence beyond a complainant’s 
account and an accused’s denials. Referring to Case 4 from the female rape study, for example, 
FRS Police I was emphatic in his literal use of the term: 
 
It is one of those [cases] that is one person’s word against another’s—entirely. She 
hasn’t seen a doctor for any injuries. She hasn’t immediately told somebody afterwards. 
You know? It is literally down to one person’s word against another’s. 
 While FRS Police I’s comments related to a specific case, other respondents who adopted the 
same strictly literal, ‘no evidence’-based interpretation of ‘one person’s word against 
another’s’ claimed that this descriptor applied to most rape cases: 
 
Quite often, that’s all you have. All you have is your complainant. You know, with other 
cases, you may have other witnesses, you may have corroborative evidence—you 
know, CCTV and all sorts of things which you can pull all those threads in to build up 
a case and, when you take everything into account, you’ve got a strong case. But quite 
often, in rape cases, you have your complainant. (MRS Prosecutor B) 
 
Notably, MRS Prosecutor B was not alone in supporting her broader claim that rape ‘quite 
often’ involves ‘one person’s word against another’s’ by pointing out the absence or lack of 
evidence in rape cases relative to the evidence generally available in other criminal cases. The 
implications of the comparison, however, are that the resulting claim is not merely that, 
evidentially, this—i.e., no evidence beyond a complainant’s account and an accused’s 
denials—is what rape cases generally look like. Rather, the claim is that, evidentially, this is 
what rape cases generally look like and other cases generally do not. In other words, when it 
comes to investigating and prosecuting suspected criminal offending, rape is different or 
‘unique’: 
 
It’s pretty well a unique type of offence in that you’ve rarely got a witness to it and 
often there is no other evidence other than the victim’s account. And usually, with 
physical assault cases, you may have injuries or some peripheral evidence and often, 
with rape cases, that isn’t the case. So, in any case that relies on one person’s word 
against another’s, there are always going to be circumstances where a jury are not sure. 
(MRS Prosecutor J) 
 
[Rapes] aren’t straightforward cases. … It’s like, it’s a case that you will not deal with 
in any other department. It’s not like you’re taking something that doesn’t belong to 
you or, potentially, you’re having a street fight where we’ve got injury and we can see 
it and we’ve got CCTV and we’ve got loads of witnesses and we’ve got these people 
who’ve seen you drunk before and we’ve got your mate who’s said you fell out at the 
bar. You don’t, very often, you don’t have all of that [in rape cases]. So, it’s looking at 
the micro-detail and it’s building your case from scratch because nothing’s there for 
you. In some cases, in a lot of your volume crime, a lot of your case is present for you 
already. But in sex cases, they very often are just offender and victim. (FRS Police H) 
 
The Trouble with the Literal Approach 
Conceptually, there is no ambiguity in this interpretative approach to ‘one person’s word 
against another’s’. The term means exactly what it says. The totality of evidence available in 
the case amounts to no more than ‘one person’s word against an other’s’: No physical or other 
tangible evidence; no scientific or medical evidence; no CCTV; no third-party witnesses (i.e., 
a person, other than the complainant or the accused, with firsthand knowledge of matters in 
issue); and so on. As a definition, then, the literal approach is clear, precise, and readily 
understood. Empirically, however, it is unconvincing. First, it is debatable what constitutes an 
absence or lack of evidence. Second, interpreted literally, ‘one person’s word against another’s’ 
does not accurately describe the available evidence in the relevant cases. Finally, and relatedly, 
given that further evidence was available in every case in the male and female rape studies said 
by respondents to be comprised of literally ‘one person’s word against another’s’, there is 
reason to doubt whether those respondents intended or expected to be taken too literally. Each 
of these difficulties is now considered in detail. 
 
‘No evidence’ may constitute evidence 
In order to understand what it means to say that there is ‘no evidence’ in a case, we need first 
to understand what evidence is. In the criminal process, and bracketing questions of 
admissibility, evidence simply means relevant information, or, as Murphy (2003, p.1) puts it, 
‘any factual datum which in some manner assists in drawing conclusions, either favourable or 
unfavourable, to some hypothesis whose proof or refutation is being attempted’. Defined in 
this manner, distinguishing between the presence and absence of evidence is complex. 
Sometimes, a lack of evidence is evidence in that its absence may inform and assist fact-finders 
in drawing factual conclusions.  
 What might reasonably be inferred from the absence of independent evidence in a 
particular case depends, of course, on why such evidence is ‘missing’ (Nance, 1991. See also 
Hamer, 2012). For instance, if there is no evidence beyond a complainant’s account and the 
accused’s denials because police did not take the allegation seriously and failed to conduct an 
adequate investigation, then the resulting lack of evidence is not probative. If, however, 
independent evidence that might reasonably be expected to be available in a given case is 
‘missing’ despite a thorough police investigation and efforts to secure it, the inferences that 
might reasonably be drawn from its absence are altogether different. Depending on a 
complainant’s account of events (and the timing of the report), for example, ‘no evidence’ of 
injuries sustained by the complainant may positively contradict her (or his) factual claims and 
assertions, thereby impugning the allegation: 
 
Has she got any injuries? Because she’s saying she was pinned down. And no, there’s 
nothing. I’ve dealt with quite a few, not just necessarily rapes but in other jobs, ‘Oh, 
he’s punched me in the face. Five, six times.’ Well, did he? Because there’s not a mark. 
He hasn’t punched you! If I punched you like that [punches fist into opposite hand]—
and that’s not hard—you would bruise. (FRS Police J) 
 
While FRS Police J was speaking in the abstract, a case from the female rape study provides a 
concrete example of an absence of evidence—or, ‘no evidence’ beyond the complainant’s 
allegations and the accused’s denials—having probative value.  
 The complainant, C, in FRS Case 6 was a long-term resident in a care home for mentally 
disordered adults. She disclosed to staff that she had been raped one weekday lunchtime in a 
narrow and secluded alleyway off the marketplace in her local town by her boyfriend at the 
time, D, also a resident in the home. Contrary to C’s wishes, staff reported the alleged incident 
to the police. When officers attended, she repeated her allegations and agreed to make a formal 
complaint. C’s various accounts of the incident, to her carers and to the police, were 
inconsistent. The alleged incident had occurred one month ago; three months ago; sometime 
during the summer. The accused had not been violent and had not threatened C in any way; the 
accused had slapped and punched her repeatedly during the incident and the complainant had 
screamed and physically resisted throughout. She had been raped against the wall in the alley; 
she had been raped on the floor in the alley; she had been raped against the wall and on the 
floor.  
 Despite their best efforts and extensive local knowledge, officers could not locate an 
alleyway off the marketplace, or anything vaguely resembling C’s description of the crime 
scene in the town centre. Unable to determine where or when the alleged incident occurred, 
CCTV footage could not be secured. Given the delay—whatever its length—in reporting the 
incident, neither scientific nor medical evidence was available. Staff at the home did not recall 
seeing any visible injuries on C at any point during the relevant period or beyond. While they 
confirmed that C and D occasionally went out on shopping trips together, staff could not recall 
C coming back from any such a trip in a distressed state as C (intermittently) claimed. They 
also stated that C had made numerous complaints (of a non-sexual nature) against D in the past 
and that on each occasion, when police had been called, she had always either refused to repeat 
her allegations and make a formal complaint, or had made complaints that she subsequently 
retracted. Her forensic social worker reported that C’s fluctuating mental health presented, 
amongst other things, as acute anxiety, paranoia, and psychosis, and that her mental condition 
had deteriorated significantly over the preceding months. As a result, C had now been moved 
to a secure hospital unit in a neighbouring county. Again, given the uncertainty around when 
the alleged rape occurred, it was impossible to ascertain—and unwise to speculate—whether 
C’s deterioration was triggered by the alleged events, a trigger for the allegation, or entirely 
unrelated. In his police interview, D consistently denied the allegations on the basis that he had 
never had sexual intercourse with C. Having exhausted all potential lines of inquiry, no further 
action was taken against D.  
 It would be both inaccurate and misleading to describe FRS Case 6, or to attempt to 
explain its failure to progress through the criminal process, in terms of an absence or lack of 
independent evidence and the case boiling down to simply ‘one person’s word against 
another’s’. There was evidence—relevant information—available, beyond C’s account(s) and 
D’s denial, and it included: not being able to find the crime scene; witnesses, including her 
professional carers, not observing any injuries or distress consistent with C’s account; and no 
good Samaritans, or witnesses of any other ilk, reporting a screaming woman being sexually 
and physically assaulted in broad daylight, at lunchtime, in a bustling town centre. FRS Police 
F was alert to the impact that C’s (and D’s) mental health difficulties might have on her ability 
to provide police with a coherent and comprehensive account of events. He was also clear that 
the ‘absence’ of independent evidence (if that is what it was) did not prove that C was not, in 
fact, raped. It did, however, raise significant—and, crucially, evidence- rather than myth-
based—doubts regarding the accuracy and reliability, if not the veracity, of the complainant’s 
account: 
 
What she was saying, it couldn’t have, it couldn’t have happened… A two foot alley? 
In [town centre], as well, where she said it happened… I mean, these are two people 
with learning difficulties so you’ve got to factor that in as well… But what she’d said 
in her disclosure, it just didn’t ring true. Not where she was suggesting. It was the 
middle of the town centre. There are alleyways but she said it was around [the 
marketplace] and there isn’t anywhere quiet there. You are always within shouting 
distance of somebody, definitely. Especially on a lunchtime. Any lunchtime on any day, 
there’s always folks knocking about. It just didn’t sound right. 
 
 The fact that the police and prosecution are not in possession of independent evidence 
that corroborates or supports a complainant’s account does not automatically equate to there 
being ‘no evidence’ beyond a complainant’s allegations and an accused’s denials. There may, 
as in FRS Case 6, be a good deal of additional information. It may not support the complaint 
but, as ‘factual datum which in some manner assists in drawing conclusions, either favourable 
or unfavourable, to some hypothesis whose proof or refutation is being attempted’ (Murphy, 
2003, p.1), it is evidence. Consequently, while it would be true to say that the only evidence of 
rape in FRS Case 6 came from the complainant, it would be disingenuous to characterize this 
case or attempt to explain its outcome in terms of ‘no evidence’, as literally boiling down to 
‘one person’s word against another’s’. On any sensible evaluation, it was the presence rather 
than the absence of evidence that brought FRS Case 6 to a close in the investigative stages of 
the criminal process.  
 
‘One person’s word against another’s’ does not reflect the research data  
Despite its proponents’ claims to the contrary, the literal, ‘no evidence’-based definition of 
‘one person’s word against another’s’ does not accurately depict the extent of the evidence 
available in the relevant cases. Indeed, the closest I came to observing a case which might 
plausibly be described as literally ‘one person’s word against another’s’ was FRS Case 16. 
This case involved a three-year-old girl, C, who, spontaneously and unprompted, disclosed to 
her mother that D, C’s 15-year-old uncle, had made her ‘suck his tail’ when he babysat the 
child a couple of weeks earlier. The incident was reported to the police almost immediately 
following this disclosure. However, apart from saying that D made her sad, C would not repeat 
her allegations. Given the delay between the offence being committed and being reported, and 
the nature of the allegation (oral penetration), a forensic medical examination was not 
conducted. Arrested and interviewed by police, D denied the allegation outright. The act 
alleged, he said, had simply never happened.  
At this point, the case could, indeed, be characterized as ‘one person’s word against 
another’s’, albeit that it was not the complainant’s testimony but rather the mother’s hearsay 
account of her daughter’s original disclosure on which any anticipated prosecution would rely. 
However, it could not be so characterized for very long. Three-quarters of an hour into his 
police interview, D confessed. He subsequently pleaded guilty to rape of a child under 13 
contrary to s.5 Sexual Offences Act 2003. On the one hand, and at the risk of stating the 
obvious, it is counterintuitive if not nonsensical to refer to a case in which an accused fully 
admits the offence alleged in terms of ‘one person’s word against another’s’. In such a scenario, 
there is no conflicting ‘word’. The prosecution’s case is uncontested. On the other hand, and 
rather less obvious, are the implications this has for the relationship between ‘one person’s 
word against another’s’ and attrition. That relationship will, to some extent, be an artefact of 
the concept’s definition in that it excludes cases resulting in a caution or guilty plea. With 
around 20 per cent of defendants charged with rape pleading guilty (Ministry of Justice, 2013), 
that is a sizeable chunk of convictions taken out of the attritional analysis on the basis that they 
cannot, as a matter of logic and commonsense, be described as ‘one person’s word against 
another’s’. Yet, at least until D confessed, that is precisely what FRS Case 16 was. While it 
may make sense, in the abstract, to say that this was not a case of ‘one person’s word against 
another’s’, if we are to develop a more robust understanding of the complex and nuanced 
relationship between the evidence in a rape case and its outcome, it would arguably be more 
enlightening to say that this was such a case and the defendant pleaded guilty anyway. 
 Beyond this solitary case, the literal interpretation was thoroughly unconvincing in the 
male and female rape studies. It just does not reflect the evidential nature of the cases analysed. 
Across both samples, where a rape allegation was contested by an accused (which, as we have 
now seen, is a necessary condition for the descriptor’s application), there was always more 
evidence available than a complainant’s and the accused’s conflicting accounts. This may, of 
course, simply mean that, in addition to being unrepresentative and non-random, both samples 
were entirely populated with atypical cases. That, however, seems unlikely. To be sure, the 
male rape sample may have been skewed to some (unknown and unquantifiable) degree by the 
sampling frame—as ‘one person’s word against another’s’ is reportedly associated with 
attrition in rape cases, such cases are more likely to be filtered out of the criminal process in 
the investigative stages and consequently less likely to appear in the CPS case-load from which 
the male rape sample was drawn. But as an ‘inactive subjects’ snapshot sample (Kaplan, 1997) 
including all allegations of female rape recorded and finalized by a specialist rape investigation 
unit over roughly a six month period, the same methodological criticism cannot be levelled at 
the female rape study.   
 A more compelling cause for confidence, in that it does not rely on chance, is that 
similar findings have been reported elsewhere. In their joint review of the investigation and 
prosecution of rape, for example, Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate and 
HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (2007, p.113) observed, ‘despite the general view about most 
cases consisting of the victim’s word against the defendant’s, in the majority of cases there was 
other evidence that provided additional weight to the victim’s account.’ Similarly, in their 
analysis of case progression in serious offences, including rape, Burton et al (2012, pp.10-11, 
29) reported that, inter alia, ‘other’ witness statements were available in 60 per cent of rape 
cases analysed, case exhibits (‘photos, clothing, weapon, bag, etc’) were available in 45 per 
cent, forensic evidence in 32 per cent, and medical evidence in 29 per cent. The generalisations 
that can sensibly be drawn from the male and female rape studies are undoubtedly limited. In 
combination with findings elsewhere, however, these data present an empirical challenge to 
widely accepted claims that rape is generally ‘one person’s word against another’s’.  
 
The literal definition is not (always) applied literally 
Without exception, respondents who identified a particular case as ‘one person’s word against 
another’s’ on the basis that there was ‘no evidence’ beyond a complainant’s account and an 
accused’s denials nevertheless went on to discuss further evidence available in that same case. 
They explained how that additional evidence supported or undermined a complainant’s account 
and gave a reasoned and detailed commentary regarding its impact on decision-making in the 
case. 
 In Case 4 from the female rape study, for example, which FRS Police I, quoted above, 
described as being ‘entirely’ and ‘literally’ a case of ‘one person’s word against another’s’, 
evidence beyond the complainant’s allegations and the accused’s denials was available. None 
of it, however, supported the complainant’s account and, in fact, generally undermined where 
it did not directly contradict it. Individuals the complainant had identified as friends in whom 
she had confided about the incident gave police witness statements denying any recollection of 
such disclosures. Another friend, a male who was in the adjoining room when the alleged rape 
occurred and whom, according to the complainant, had heard her physically and verbally 
resisting the accused, gave a statement to police saying that he had heard nothing of the kind 
that evening. This witness further contradicted the complainant by stating that there was 
nothing about her demeanour the following morning that had suggested to him that anything 
untoward might have occurred and concluded his statement by expressing his surprise at C’s 
allegations.  
Further difficulties were raised by C’s conduct following the alleged incident. The 
complainant and accused had previously been in a long term sexual relationship which had 
ended some weeks prior to the alleged rape. This relationship had been rekindled immediately 
following the alleged rape, before coming to a final and embittered end a couple of months 
later. This evidence, in combination with the problematic witness evidence outlined above, 
raised questions surrounding the perceived reliability of the complainant’s account: 
 
She says she told her friends at certain times and her friends say, ‘She didn’t tell us 
that.’ And there were lots of inconsistencies there. … To take that to court and ask 
someone to be sure, beyond reasonable doubt. It’s not a popularity contest. It’s not a 
case of who they believe most at court. But, then, it isn’t even a level playing field with 
that because then you take into account the fact that, well, there were other people in 
the house and she didn’t shout out or anything, and she didn’t tell anybody about it 
immediately, even if it wasn’t reported to police, and then she has gone back and had a 
normal consenting relationship with him when she was under no pressure to do that. 
And those undermining things, rightly or wrongly, matter in court. (FRS Police I) 
 
In addition, some weeks after the couple’s final break-up, and coinciding with the 
accused having met a new girlfriend, the complainant sent D a ‘friend request’ on Facebook. 
When he did not accept this request, C contacted D via Facebook Messenger demanding an 
explanation. A heated and increasingly hostile exchange between the two followed, during 
which C threatened, several times, to tell the police that he had raped her. The content of this 
exchange was reproduced and documented in full by D following his arrest. It was anticipated 
that this evidence would be used by the defence to support the accused’s claim that this was a 
false and malicious allegation by a slighted ex-girlfriend motivated by jealousy and a desire for 
revenge: 
 
It would be something the defence would make something of, rightly or wrongly. I’m 
a big believer in it doesn’t matter what happens before and it doesn’t matter what 
happens afterwards, it’s actually what happens at that point in time. But, if the defence 
can then twist that to, ‘He’s interested in another girl and you’ve got bitter about that, 
and why would you want to “friend” somebody who’d raped you? Why would you do 
that?’ And defence would make a play of that because the jury will sit there and say, 
‘Well, yes. If she has been raped by him, why would she want to be friends with him? 
And they’ve split up. Why doesn’t she just walk off?’ And it’s putting those little bits 
of doubt in a jury’s minds which is what the defence lawyers are very good at doing.  
 
 During our research interview, FRS Police I had been emphatic in his assertions that 
this was literally a case of ‘one person’s word against another’s’. Nevertheless, in explaining 
the decision to take no further action against the accused, it was the presence rather than an 
absence of independent evidence to which he referred. It seems reasonable to suggest therefore 
that, either, FRS Police I did not literally mean what he said, or, he did, and FRS Case 4 cannot 
persuasively be described in such terms.  
 MRS Prosecutor B’s anecdotal discussions of a (female) rape case she was dealing with 
at the time of our research interview raises the same interpretative dilemma:  
 
There’s no medical [evidence]. There’s not really any forensic [evidence]. It’s her word 
against his. That’s what it boils down to at the end of the day. And, on paper, she comes 
across as very credible and very plausible. But who knows? Because obviously he’s—
the defendant—he’s going to say, ‘It was normal sexual intercourse. She consented to 
it. We have sex all the time and this was just another occasion when we had sex and 
there’s no way she didn’t consent.’ And she’s going to say, ‘Well, I didn’t.’ And that’s 
it. We’ve got nothing really. [Pause.] I mean, we’ve got the recent complaint to the 
friend and the sister, which is good, but, apart from that, we don’t have anything. 
Whereas, in other [types of criminal] cases, you know, you do have. In other cases, 
there’s forensic or other corroborative evidence that you can rely on to back up what 
your complainant is saying.  
 
In contrast to FRS Case 4, the accused in the instant case had been charged with two 
counts of rape and was due to stand trial the following week. When asked to explain how she 
had reached the decision that there was sufficient evidence to prosecute in this case, MRS 
Prosecutor B referred not only to the positive impact of independent evidence gathered by 
investigators that supported the complainant’s account, but also to the verified ‘absence’ of 
evidence—no record of Social Services involvement with the family; no previous allegations 
by the complainant; and no criminal convictions—that might be exploited by the defence in an 
effort to undermine it. Her comments, worth quoting in full, are both incisive and revealing: 
 
We decided that there was a likely prospect of conviction because she had made 
immediate complaints both times. She was clearly distraught—told her work colleague. 
And the work colleague gives evidence that she was very upset and all the rest of it. 
She then goes home and is allegedly raped again and tells her sister. Immediately goes 
to the police station, goes for the [forensic medical] examination and all the rest of it 
and there’s nothing in her background to suggest that she, she—you know, sometimes 
we get cases where the complainant comes forward and, of course, then you find out 
that they’ve made allegations in the past. They’ve made false allegations and all sorts 
of things which would undermine their credibility. There’s absolutely nothing to 
suggest that she would do that. And so it was felt that there would be a likely prospect 
[of conviction] because she is plausible. And he’s not, particularly, in interview. Well, 
I don’t think he answers any questions actually. I think he just gives a prepared 
statement. He says, I think, he says something like, ‘Yes, we’ve been married and we 
have a normal sexual relationship between husband and wife and I don’t want to talk 
about it anymore.’ And then doesn’t answer any more questions. So I think that counts 
against him. But, really, it’s very borderline. I think they are very borderline, these 
cases. And lots of them don’t get that far. And I think, possibly, if there was any 
indication that she had any kind of background of making allegations in the past, or any 
criminal convictions, that might sway it the other way. 
 
If ‘one person’s word against another’s’ literally means what it says, then, like FRS Case 4 
above, its application here is unconvincing. Evidence beyond the complainant’s allegations and 
the accused’s denials was available. MRS Prosecutor B had taken it into account in her own 
decision-making and, the following week, the jury in D’s trial would be taking it into account 
in theirs. This was not, in short, a case of literally ‘one person’s word against another’s’.  
 This material discrepancy, this mis-match between how the concept is defined and how 
it may be used or applied in practice, problematizes what we can reliably infer about the nature 
and extent of the evidence available in rape cases explicitly described as ‘one person’s word 
against another’s’ and broader empirical claims that this is what rape cases generally look like. 
In other words, if people—here, police and prosecutors, but, by extrapolation, researchers, 
commentators, policy-makers, and so on—do not always mean what they say, then ‘one 
person’s word against another’s’ cannot be taken as a reliable signal for the wholesale absence 
of independent evidence in a given case of rape. Nor can it reliably tell us anything about the 
availability or otherwise of independent evidence in rape cases generally. But then, as will be 
seen below, other respondents did not suggest that it did. 
 
The Issue-based Approach 
On close inspection, the interview data reveal a second, more common interpretative approach 
to ‘one person’s word against another’s’. Respondents who subscribed to this alternate 
interpretation did not focus on the availability or otherwise of independent evidence in the case 
as a whole but rather on the evidence relating to what they identified as being the key or pivotal 
contested issue in a given case. If direct evidence on that particular issue was limited to a 
complainant’s account and the accused’s denial, then the case was likely to be described as 
‘one person’s word against another’s’.  
 Although by no means the only issue identified by respondents as amounting, 
evidentially, to ‘one person’s word against another’s’, consent was the issue most frequently 
referred to in these terms. Specifically, and reported to be the most common scenario in rape 
cases, police and prosecutors referred to the accused who has admitted penetrative sexual 
activity but denies rape on the basis that the complainant was consenting at the time:  
 
Most rape cases, the defence is going to be consent. You know, male or female, that’s 
generally speaking going to be the defence. And it’s just par for the course … Generally 
speaking, rapes happen in private between two people and it’s very—it’s going to 
always end up being the word of the one against the other as to whether there was 
consensual intercourse or not. (MRS Prosecutor N) 
 
In such a scenario, the probative value of independent evidence is often equivocal. Scientific 
or medical evidence demonstrating that the accused engaged in penetrative sexual activity with 
the complainant, for example, or, third party witnesses or CCTV images indicating that the 
complainant and the accused were together at a particular place or a particular time will, 
typically, be as consistent with the accused’s innocence as it is with his guilt. The crux of the 
issue-based approach, then, is not so much the absence of independent evidence per se on a 
particular issue, but rather the absence of unambiguous independent evidence on that issue: 
 
It’s the nature of the offence that makes it very, very difficult to get a conviction. 
Because the forensic element of it can often be explained away by consent so that the 
issue just becomes consent. It’s not, ‘We can prove you did it. So you must have done 
it. We can place you at the scene for a burglary.’ In the absence of another explanation, 
there’s a really strong inference that he’s committed the burglary. But the fact that he’s 
had sex with her doesn’t mean he’s raped her, because he’s saying it’s consent and she’s 
saying it isn’t. If there isn’t a lot of injuries—if there’s injuries, photographs, force, it 
helps. You’ve always got to try and look for these other things. But very often there 
isn’t. Very often, it’s word against word. (MRS Prosecutor I) 
 
In a rape investigation, it’s usually one person’s word against another’s. That’s a bit of 
a generalisation, but it—you know, in the instances of consent, where the defendant 
says, ‘No, it was with consent’, there aren’t normally any witnesses to that. And you’ve 
immediately taken forensics out of the equation. So we have the victim saying, ‘I was 
raped’, and the defendant saying, ‘No. She was happy at the time.’ (FRS Police E) 
 
Thus, according to respondents, consent is generally the pivotal issue in a rape case and, absent 
compelling, if not conclusive, independent evidence of guilt—like significant injuries or a 
third-party witness to material events—the case will almost inevitably boil down to ‘one 
person’s word against another’s’: 
 
[Rape] is harder to prove. Just because it’s normally one person’s word against another. 
That’s what it boils down to. If anybody with half a brain’s cute about it, then he can 
play the consent route. That’s the easiest way to get yourself out of it. Because if there’s 
only two of you in that room, only two of you know what’s happened. (MRS Police E) 
 
Evidentially, they don’t do it in the semi-circle at [the local football stadium] at half-
time. It’s nearly always word against word. (MRS Prosecutor I) 
 
The Trouble with the Issue-based Approach 
Compared to the literal, ‘no evidence’-based approach, the issue-based interpretation of ‘one 
person’s word against another’s’ is ambiguous. In referring to the evidence available on a 
particular contested issue in the case, rather than to the totality of evidence available in the case 
as a whole, the term means what it says, but it means what it says only indirectly. The concept 
is thus vague and somewhat elusive.  
 Empirically, as a description of rape cases, the issue-based approach is more sustainable 
than its literal counterpart. It might legitimately be applied, at some stage in proceedings, to 
somewhere over half of the male and female sample cases and therefore sits reasonably 
comfortably with police and prosecutors’ claims here—and the received wisdom more 
broadly—that rape is generally ‘one person’s word against another’s’. Quantitatively, for 
reasons set out in the following sections, this conceptualization is amenable to, at best, rough-
and-ready measurement and it is trickier than might be imagined to provide a more concrete 
and precise count here. The more pressing problems with this conceptualization, however, are 
qualitative. On the issue-based approach, ‘one person’s word against another’s’ is decidedly 
(and deceptively) uninformative, over-inclusive, and misleading. The various, and often 
profound, difficulties presented by this interpretation, and their implications for the term’s 
descriptive and explanatory value, will now be explored. 
 
The accused does not have to say anything and anything he does say is liable 
to change 
On the issue-based approach to ‘one person’s word against another’s’, categorization is 
contingent upon the factual issues contested by the defence and the evidence available to prove 
those contested issues either way. It depends, in short, on what the accused is saying, what facts 
he is disputing. While the paradigmatic image conjured up by ‘one person’s word against 
another’s’ involves a dramatic and acrimonious courtroom battle with the word of the 
complainant pitted against that of the accused, the procedural reality is that the accused does 
not have to say anything. Instead, he enjoys the privilege against self-incrimination and the 
associated right to silence which means he does not have to give an account of the events 
alleged at any stage of the criminal process, and he most certainly does not have to give us his 
word (see generally Quirk, 2016).  
 To be sure, these rights are not without their limits. Following the enactment of sections 
34-38 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, a jury may, under certain 
circumstances, be entitled to draw such inferences as are proper from an accused’s silence—
essentially, if he later changes his story or introduces previously unmentioned exculpatory facts 
(ibid. See also Jackson, 2001; Dennis, 2002; Cooper, 2006). Nevertheless, an accused is under 
no obligation to answer questions put to him during the pre-trial, investigative stages of the 
criminal process. Nor is he obliged, and cannot be compelled, to testify or adduce any evidence 
in his own defence at any subsequent trial. Instead, the burden of proof rests squarely on the 
prosecution which, single-handedly, must persuade the jury of the accused’s guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt,3 or, in its more contemporary juridical form, ‘so that they are sure’.4  
 Despite the popular imagery of fact-finders in rape cases choosing which of the 
complainant’s and accused’s competing accounts they believe, in reality, there might not be 
two accounts. And if there are two accounts, the steep, and principled, asymmetry of the 
probative burdens borne by the parties in English criminal proceedings means that it is for the 
prosecution, and the prosecution alone, to prove its case and to do so to the requisite criminal 
standard. The individual accused of rape is neither required nor expected to prove his 
innocence. Consequently, the only account that must persuade the jury—and to an exacting 
standard—is the one adduced by the prosecution. Where it fails to do so, the presumption of 
innocence mandates that the jury acquit.  
                                           
3 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462. 
4 R v Summers [1952] 1 All ER 1059; Walters v R [1969] 1 AC 26; R v Majid [2009] EWCA Crim 
2563. 
 This procedural context problematizes the categorization of cases as amounting, or not 
amounting, to ‘one person’s word against another’s’ under the issue-based approach. Where 
an accused exercises his right to silence, it will not always be clear what the contested issues 
in the case actually are:   
 
He’s not giving an account is he? If he just sits there and goes ‘No comment’ then he’s 
not actually giving an account. He’s not telling us he hasn’t done it. If he was to give 
an account and say, ‘I haven’t done it because of X, Y and Z’, then potentially there are 
lines of inquiry that we can then follow. But, if he was to sit there and say, ‘No 
comment’, then he’s not saying he hasn’t done it—he’s not saying he has. But he’s not 
saying he hasn’t. (FRS Police H) 
 
Anticipating the pivotal issue or issues in any given case may therefore be something of a 
guessing game:  
 
You’ve got to guess at what their case is going to be. To guess at what line of defence 
they’re going to put… Most of the time, to be honest, you can guess—you can guess—
what they’re going to say or what their line of attack’s going to be. And generally, 
there’s only going to be one or two or three possible defences. Either, ‘It wasn’t me. I 
wasn’t there. Wrong ID’. Or it’s a factual issue, ‘They’re making it up. They’re lying’. 
(MRS Prosecutor A) 
 
In the absence of an account from the accused, the investigation must, by necessity, be led by 
the complainant’s account and will proceed on the assumption that anything and everything 
she (or he) has said may be contested by the defence.  
 Evidence gathering and case construction is an ongoing and dynamic process. 
Typically, the evidential case will emerge and evolve over time, and may do so in unanticipated 
ways: a witness’s evidence may change; complainants (and other witnesses) may retract or 
withdraw their statements, or simply refuse to cooperate with an ongoing investigation or to 
testify at any subsequent trial; scientific test results may be inconclusive or, alternatively, may 
exonerate a suspect; existing lines of inquiry may lead to naught; and new and unexpected lines 
of inquiry may come to light. In short, even the most diligent and comprehensive of 
investigations may not yield a strong evidential case against an accused.  Notwithstanding the 
threat of adverse inferences being drawn from his pre-trial silence further down the line—
which is no threat at all to the suspect who is not subsequently charged—an accused’s interests 
in avoiding prosecution may be best served by keeping quiet, particularly in the early stages of 
an investigation, and simply waiting to see what, if any, evidence the police can come up with. 
Once the accused has a clearer and more complete picture of the evidence against him, he may 
then decide to waive the right to silence and start talking: 
 
Sometimes, if they say nothing initially—‘no reply’ the interview—but then we get 
[forensic test results], ‘Well, you obviously did have sex with her because we’ve found 
semen inside her and it’s yours a million to one.’ ‘Oh. Yeah. It was consensual.’ That’s 
the difficulty. Certainly with adults. It’s, ‘She consented.’ (MRS Prosecutor I) 
 
 Moreover, if the accused is talking, if he has given an account—indeed, even following 
the submission of a statement outlining his defence,5 should the case have progressed that far—
                                           
5 Section 5 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (as amended). Defence statements are not 
always submitted in a timely manner, or at all, and those that are provided may be vague and reveal 
little of any real usefulness. See further M Redmayne, ‘Criminal Justice Act 2003: (1) Disclosure and 
its Discontents’ [2004] Crim LR 441-462; R Denyer, ‘Non-compliance with Case Management 
Orders and Directions’ [2008] Crim LR 784-792; R Denyer, ‘The Defence Statement’ [2009] Crim 
LR 340-345. 
he does not have to stick to it. In MRS Case 9, for example, the defendant’s account altered 
throughout the pre-trial process, apparently to fit and explain the medical and other scientific 
evidence that slowly but surely mounted against him: there had been no physical let alone any 
sexual contact between him and C; he had engaged in some rough horseplay with C but there 
had been no sexual activity or sexual undertones whatsoever; they had engaged in rough 
horseplay on the night in question, and D had masturbated when he returned home the 
following morning; C had initiated some non-penetrative, and entirely—mutually—consensual 
sexual exploration between the (under-age) parties, culminating in D having masturbated and 
ejaculated onto C’s stomach.  
 
The minute that our forensic evidence came back with his semen was the time when his 
defence statement changed, and most dramatically, to say that there was sexual activity 
of some kind. And at that point, once we got the forensic evidence, we thought he’d 
plead guilty. But he didn’t. (MRS Prosecutor G) 
 
D’s version of events changed yet again when he testified in his own defence at trial to the 
effect that, at C’s request and with C’s express consent, D had, in fact, attempted to penetrate 
C anally but, he said, had been unsuccessful having ‘only got the tip in’. As the slightest 
penetration suffices for the purposes of the SOA 2003, and given the complainant’s age, this 
was tantamount to a courtroom confession to sexual activity with a child contrary to s.9 SOA 
2003. D was immediately re-arraigned, charged accordingly, and pleaded guilty. 
In the face of an unknown or shifting defence, categorizing a case in terms of ‘one 
person’s word against another’s’ on the issue-based approach is a precarious and tentative 
exercise based, to varying degrees, on speculation and guesswork. As both the issues being 
disputed and the evidence available to prove them are dynamic over time, whether we can 
accurately describe a case as ‘one person’s word against another’s’ may vary depending on 
when we observe and seek to categorize the case. Just because a case amounts to ‘one person’s 
word against another’s’ today does not mean it will amount to ‘one person’s word against 
another’s’ tomorrow, and certainly does not mean it will still be ‘one person’s word against 
another’s’ by the time the case gets to trial, should it do so. Moreover, as FRS Case 16 above 
demonstrates, even in the absence of evidence beyond the complaint itself, there is always the 
possibility that an accused will suddenly confess all and plead guilty. At different stages of the 
proceedings, then, the same case may look very different. This inherent contingency 
problematizes categorical assertions that a case does or does not—or, where the descriptor is 
applied retrospectively, did or did not—amount to ‘one person’s word against another’s’.  
 
‘One person’s word against another’s’ reveals little about a case 
As a description, at least as it is defined on the issue-based approach, ‘one person’s word 
against another’s’ is astonishingly nondescript. Despite the widespread belief that ‘one 
person’s word against another’s’ captures some essential evidential feature or attribute 
common to rape that sets it apart from other criminal offences and, in turn, goes some way to 
explaining high rates of attrition in rape cases, in reality, it tells us very little about a case, and 
still less about its outcome. In some instances, the disparity between what it sounds like ‘one 
person’s word against another’s’ tells us about a case and what it actually tells us is so vast that 
the descriptor is not merely uninformative, it is positively misleading. 
 In MRS Case 3, for example, the complainant alleged that he had been beaten, robbed, 
and (repeatedly) raped, anally and orally, by two unknown males as he was making his way 
home after a night out with friends. As C had immediately reported the incident to police, 
investigators were able to secure a good deal of independent evidence. CCTV footage showed 
the two accused following C on foot for some time through the local area before catching hold 
of him and forcibly dragging him into an alleyway not covered by CCTV cameras. Further 
footage showed the two accused subsequently leaving the alleyway together before the (now 
visibly distressed and injured) complainant emerged and made his way directly to the nearby 
police station. In addition, there was medical and other documentary evidence of C’s extensive 
injuries consistent with a violent physical and sexual assault; scientific evidence indicating that 
the two accused had engaged in recent penetrative activity with C; and valuable personal effects 
belonging to C recovered by the police during searches of the two accused’s homes. 
 Following his arrest, D1 admitted the relevant penetrative sexual activity but claimed 
that this was consensual and had been actively procured by C in return for payment in cash and 
in kind. Despite forensic evidence to the contrary, D2 maintained that he had not engaged in 
any sexual activity whatsoever with C but had merely held C’s coat for him and kept look-out. 
Both accused consistently denied being physically violent towards C and could offer no 
explanation as to how his injuries had come about.  
 Unsurprisingly, given the wealth and strength of the evidence against them, D1 and D2 
were charged with and prosecuted for multiple offences, including, between them, seven counts 
of rape and attempted rape. 
 
There was so much external corroboration. … On paper, I thought that was a sure-fire 
conviction, in as much as you ever have a sure-fire conviction on a rape case. … It’s a 
totally straightforward case and I thought it was a stone bonker.6 (MRS Prosecutor N) 
 
I was somewhat taken aback therefore, when, during our research interview, MRS Prosecutor 
N described the case as ‘one person’s word against another’s’. In response to my (presumably 
                                           
6 ‘Stone bonker’ is British slang for ‘a certainty’. 
palpable) surprise, she remarked, ‘I know there was a lot of corroboration. But at the end of the 
day, the only real evidence of the rape was coming from him.’  
 Of course, as we have seen, on the issue-based approach, ‘one person’s word against 
another’s’ does not reflect and does not endeavour to describe the nature, scope, or strength of 
the totality of evidence against an accused. The trouble is, it sounds like it does. It is surely 
counterintuitive to describe a case involving an abundance of highly probative and compelling 
independent evidence that supports and corroborates a complainant’s account and undermines, 
although is not wholly inconsistent with, the accused’s (dubious) version(s) of events in terms 
of ‘one person’s word against another’s’, with all the undeniably negative connotations that the 
descriptor entails. ‘One person’s word against another’s’ does not meaningfully or usefully 
describe MRS Case 3 and it certainly does not explain why the case was so confidently 
prosecuted. Its application here is, nevertheless, revealing in that it throws the descriptive 
limitations of the concept into sharp relief.  
 On the issue-based approach, ‘one person’s word against another’s’ tells us that there 
is an allegation of rape, but it does not tell us who made it. It tells us that something is in issue 
between the prosecution and defence, but it does not directly or infallibly tell us what that issue 
is. And while consent may be the matter most commonly or most commonly anticipated to be 
disputed by an accused, across the male and female rape studies, consent and/or reasonable 
belief therein was raised in a little under half of the sampled cases (16 out of 37). It should not 
be assumed, therefore, that consent will be the pivotal issue in any given case, or that it will be 
the pivotal issue in the overwhelming majority of cases. Whatever the pivotal issue is, ‘one 
person’s word against another’s’ tells us that, in proving that issue, the prosecution will be 
reliant on the direct testimonial evidence of a particular witness, often but not invariably the 
complainant. It does not tell us whether and, if so, to what extent that witness’s evidence is 
generally supported or, conversely, contradicted by other independent evidence. Indeed, it does 
not tell us anything about the credibility of that witness or the reliability of his or her evidence. 
In short, ‘one person’s word against another’s’ reveals virtually nothing about the quantity or 
quality of evidence available in any given case. It certainly does not mean that the only 
evidence available to the police, prosecution, and, ultimately, the court is a complainant’s 
testimonial account—her (or his) ‘word’. Nor does it mean that the only evidence available to 
challenge the prosecution’s case is the ‘word’ of the accused. 
 Given that, on this approach, ‘one person’s word against another’s’ reveals so little 
about the evidence in rape cases, individually or collectively, it is difficult to see how the 
concept might usefully contribute to our understanding of why rape is so prone to attrition. 
Unless, of course, the epistemological claim underpinning ‘one person’s word against 
another’s’ (on either the literal or the issue-based interpretative approach) is that, for the 
purposes of criminal adjudication, ‘taking someone’s word for it’ does not suffice as proof. As 
the discussion below demonstrates, if that is the claim, then, at least in relation to criminal 
proceedings in England and Wales, it is simply wrong.  
 
One person’s ‘word’ is enough 
Institutionally, the English criminal process has no qualms about convicting an accused on the 
‘word’ of a single witness and is positively, and on principle, set up to do so. Reflecting 
‘English law’s culturally embedded ideological preference for live witness testimony’ (Roberts 
and Zuckerman, 2010, p.292), the sworn testimonial account of a witness is the paradigmatic 
form of evidence in English criminal proceedings in which, generally, there is no legally 
mandated quantitative evidential threshold for conviction:  
 
In contrast to most continental legal systems (and also, intriguingly, Scotland), there is 
no general corroboration requirement in English criminal law. Even very serious 
offences like murder, robbery, and rape are capable of being proved by the testimony 
of a single witness, or, in theory at least, entirely by damning circumstantial evidence. 
… Once evidence is before the fact-finder, the only question is whether the appropriate 
standard of proof has been met. Jurors in England and Wales, for the most part, are not 
required to calibrate their verdicts to quantitative evidentiary standards. (ibid, p.662, 
footnotes omitted.)  
 
That it is the quality and not the quantity of evidence that matters is clearly reflected in criminal 
justice policy, and, specifically, in the principles to be applied to prosecution decision-making 
as set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors (CPS, 2013). The CPS Legal Guidance on what 
is now commonly referred to as the ‘merits based approach’ (CPS, undated. See further 
Ashworth and Redmayne, 2010; Birch and Price, 2016) to prosecution decision-making under 
the Code—and applicable in all cases, not just rape—explicitly cautions prosecutors as follows: 
 
It is essential that prosecutors do not introduce a requirement for corroboration in the 
review process—one person’s word can be enough (and often is)—but the quality of 
the evidence must be assessed. Where it is one person’s word against another’s then a 
jury will look to other factors to help decide whether the prosecution has proved its 
case. The review should disregard factors that are irrelevant or based on myths or 
stereotypes. We should expect juries to be properly directed about delayed complaints 
and other matters that might give rise to misconceived assumptions.  
 
That ‘one person’s word’ is enough to secure a conviction plays no part in the critical 
discourse around rape in the English criminal justice system. This striking omission risks 
presenting an, at best, incomplete and, at worst, misleading picture of the domestic criminal 
process and one which, potentially, misinforms both the debate and its audience—including 
existing and future victims of rape who, given the conventional wisdom, might reasonably 
conclude that if their case involves ‘one person’s word against another’s’ (whatever they think 
that means) it will not proceed and may be reluctant to report an incident, or co-operate with 
its investigation and prosecution, as a result. As MRS Prosecutor L observed: 
 
I think there’s this perception as well that if it’s one person’s word against the other, 
we don’t prosecute. That couldn’t be further from the truth. The majority of rapes will 
be one person’s word against another’s. There’s this perception that people who are 
being raped will shout and scream very, very loudly for help and they often don’t—for 
a whole variety of reasons. And there’s this perception that people who are raped are 
going to have extensive bruising or injury or trauma to the tissues around their body 
and the vast majority—I would say something like 80 per cent of rape victims—have 
no visible injury at all. And so, if it were simply the case that one person’s word against 
another’s was not enough, we might as well all pack up and go home.  
 
FRS Police M concurred that rape cases constituting ‘one person’s word against another’s’ do 
progress through the criminal process: 
 
That’s our system isn’t it? One person’s word against the other’s and see who the jury 
believe. But they do go forward. They do, yeah. 
 
Indeed, according to MRS Prosecutor J, when it comes to prosecuting rape, proceeding with 
cases involving ‘one person’s word against another’s’ is unexceptional: 
 
We don’t need corroboration clearly. We don’t necessarily need support. Clearly, we’re 
perfectly able to run a one against one case. It’s just that sometimes juries may find it 
difficult to be sure to the required standard if it is just one against one. But we do 
frequently run one against one cases. 
 
 As discussed above, ‘one person’s word against another’s’ is not easily quantified. 
Although crude and imprecise, it is, nevertheless, true to say that some of the cases in the male 
and female rape studies might plausibly be described as ‘one person’s word against another’s’, 
at least on the issue-based approach, and at least momentarily. Some of those sample cases 
amounting to ‘one person’s word against another’s’ were prosecuted. And some of those 
prosecuted cases resulted in conviction. In practice, then, as well as in principle, ‘one person’s 
word’ is enough. It is clearly not always enough. But as a matter of both doctrinal law and 
empirically verifiable practice, the ‘word’ of one witness will do.  
 
The Trouble with ‘One Person’s Word against Another’s’ 
According to the mainstream account, a ‘culture of scepticism’ (Kelly et al, 2005) prevails in 
the investigation and prosecution of rape where, in the absence of independent evidence, 
complainants are routinely disbelieved. Underpinning this widely accepted narrative, is the 
conventional wisdom of rape as ‘one person’s word against another’s’ which purports to not 
only describe what rape cases look like evidentially, but to also shed explanatory light on why 
they so frequently fail to result in conviction. The trouble with ‘one person’s word against 
another’s’, however, and the key finding reported here, is that while we may all use the phrase, 
or nod knowingly along when others use it, there is a lack of consensus as to its meaning. Some 
interpret the term literally. Others do not. 
Interpreted literally, ‘one person’s word against another’s’ means exactly what it says—
no evidence is available beyond the conflicting accounts of the complainant and the accused. 
Although unambiguous, this conceptualization is problematic. As we have seen, what amounts 
to ‘no evidence’ is, itself, open to debate. Given the available research data, there is also reason 
to doubt whether it accurately reflects the evidence available in most rape cases. Moreover, 
there is a potential disconnect between the term’s interpretation in the abstract and its 
application in practice. Certainly, respondents here described cases that were patently not 
literally ‘one person’s word against another’s’ as ‘literally’ ‘one person’s word against 
another’s’. The second, and, here, more common, issue-based interpretative approach is also 
problematic, albeit for different reasons. On this alternate conceptualization, ‘one person’s 
word against another’s’ does not reflect, and does not pretend to describe, the totality of 
evidence in a case. Instead, it refers to the limited direct evidence on a pivotal issue. Whether 
a case amounts to ‘one person’s word against another’s’ thus depends on what, if anything, the 
accused is saying, and the evidence available to refute those claims, factors that, as we have 
seen, can and do change over the lifetime of a case, up to and including at trial. Categorization 
on this approach may therefore be tentative and mercurial. But it is also counterintuitive in that 
cases involving a good deal of compelling probative evidence—even 'stone bonkers’—may 
fall within its definitional scope. Finally, and like its literal counterpart, the issue-based 
interpretation implies a need for corroborative evidence. Yet, as we have seen, while a plethora 
of independent evidence and a legion of third-party witnesses may make for a weightier case 
against an accused (depending, of course, on what such evidence tends to show, and what those 
witnesses have to say), the ‘word’ of a single witness is proof enough.  
Because the concept’s meaning is not universally shared or consistently applied, ‘one 
person’s word against another’s’ does not reliably tell us anything about the quantity, quality, 
nature, or form of the evidence in rape cases and the strength (or otherwise) of an individual 
case. Indeed, all it tells us for sure is that an allegation has been made which the accused is 
(currently) denying and that, should the case proceed to trial, the defence intends (or is 
expected) to take issue with the direct testimonial evidence of a key prosecution witness—
often, but not always, the complainant. In the context of an adversarial criminal process 
committed to the principle of orality (McEwan, 1992; Roberts and Zuckerman, 2010), and the 
evidential significance of cross-examination within such an adjudicative framework, this is not 
to tell us very much. Moreover, in the course of not telling us very much, and certainly nothing 
unique or distinctive about rape cases or why they are so susceptible to attrition, ‘one person’s 
word against another’s’ presents a partial and misleading view of English criminal proceedings 
and the process of proof.  
 As we have seen, in English criminal proceedings, the uncorroborated testimony of a 
single witness is sufficient to secure a conviction for rape, both in principle and in practice. If 
we genuinely want to understand attrition in rape cases, and endeavour to reduce it, we need to 
understand why the ‘word’ of a single witness constituted sufficient proof in one rape case but 
not in another. The data and findings presented here suggest that, in order to do that, we need 
to grapple with the thorny issue of the credibility of witnesses, including rape complainants, 
and the reliability of their evidence—not just in terms of the absence of independent evidence 
that supports or corroborates a witness’s account, but also the presence of independent evidence 
that undermines it. We need, in short, to start talking—frankly, reasonably, and rationally—
about the inferences that might reasonably be drawn from such ostensibly mundane and trivial 
issues as who said what on Facebook and not being able to find the alleged crime scene.  
 Such complex, case-specific factual issues and evidential circumstances are not 
generally acknowledged, let alone examined, in mainstream (predominantly feminist) research 
and analyses, presumably on the basis that they are not the stuff of ‘rape myths’ or indicative 
of gendered power relations. The trouble with the mainstream’s approach, however, is that 
proof beyond reasonable doubt is an exacting standard. And it is precisely these ostensibly 
mundane and trivial issues that raise bone fide, and, crucially, evidence- rather than myth-based 
doubts about the credibility and reliability of a significant witness in the case—usually, but not 
invariably, the complainant—and may make an alleged rape difficult, if not impossible, to 
prove. This is not to rule out the possibility of gendered stereotyping or the operation of ‘rape 
myths’ in other cases. Rather it is to say that, if we are to push the boundaries of our critical 
understanding of rape in the contemporary criminal process and develop a comprehensive and 
robust account of when and why cases are filtered out pre-trial, we need to broaden the inquiry 
to include sustained attention to evidence and proof. In the meantime, appeals to the 
conceptually, empirically, and normatively troublesome conventional wisdom of ‘one person’s 
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